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WHAT To Do WITH AMERICA'S NUCLEAR DEFENSE WASTE:
THE HANFORD EFFECT
JOSEPH A. COHEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
There are two general categories of nuclear waste: defense waste
and commercial waste. Defense waste encompasses all waste produced for
military purposes, while commercial waste refers to spent fuel from
electricity producing power plants.' Today, the future of where both forms
of waste will be disposed of, especially defense waste, is in a state of
uncertainty due to the termination of the Yucca Mountain Project and the
failure of the Obama Administration to propose a detailed, alternate plan.2
This Article reviews the history and background of defense waste
in the United States by focusing on the Hanford Nuclear Reservation
("Hanford"), which stores ninety percent of defense waste. It argues that
the federal government must have a sense of urgency in deciding what to do
with Hanford's waste. It also discusses the federal government's long
history of failure in responsibly managing the back-end of the nuclear fuel
cycle, the cause of which is largely political maneuvering. This Article also
critiques the Obama Administration's nuclear waste policy for leaving the
issue to Congress without offering a true roadmap, presents and analyzes
three options for how Congress can proceed on the issue of defense waste,
and discusses the significant impact Hanford would have on the viability of
each option. These options are: include defense waste in plans for the
* J.D., May 2015, The George Washington University Law School; M.A., Government,
2008, Georgetown University; B.A., Political Science, 2003, Western Washington University. I would
like to thank my parents for their unwavering support and encouragement. I would also like to thank
Professor Dave Jonas for his guidance during the writing of this Article.
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available
brochures/brd216/r2/brO216r2.pdf.

at
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2 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, STRATEGY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL
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20Used%20Nuclear/o20Fuel%20and%20High%20Level%20Radioactive%20Waste.pdf;
Mountain 'Terminated, WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS (May 8, 2009), http://www.world-nuclearnews.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=25183.
3 Associated Press & Herald Staff, Blue Ribbon Commission Says U.S. Should Start Looking
for Yucca Alternative, TRI-CITY HERALD (Jan. 27, 2012) [hereinafter US Should Start Looking for
Yucca Alternative], http://www.tri-cityherald.com/2012/01/27/1803374/blue-ribbon-commission-saysus.html?storylink--tacoma.
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Obama Administration's proposed interim sites; build a repository solely
for defense waste; or continue storing defense waste at current locations
while expanding the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant ("WIPP") in New Mexico.
Finally, this Article concludes that moving defense waste to interim storage
facilities and expanding America's only deep geologic repository has the
best chance of success.
II. BACKGROUND
As previously stated, nuclear waste is typically split into two
categories. First, "defense waste" refers to nuclear waste to which the U.S.
government has title.4 The term is commonly used to refer to high-level
radioactive waste that is the by-product of nuclear weapons production and
spent fuel from the Navy's nuclear powered warships.' The second
category, "commercial waste," refers to spent nuclear fuel from electricitygenerating nuclear power plants.6 Overall, both types of nuclear wastes
combine to create the subject matter for what is perhaps one of the greatest
failures of the modern U.S. federal government: managing the back-end of
the nuclear fuel cycle. As used in this Article, the phrase "back-end" refers
to what is done with nuclear waste after it has been used and must be
stored.
As a result of the radiation emitted by decaying unstable elements
within the waste, high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel are extremely
hazardous materials. 7 Moreover, the danger posed by the waste is a longterm concern, as the decaying process for some of the unstable elements
may take hundreds of thousands of years.8 Thus, the management and
policies of permanent nuclear waste disposal are of paramount importance
to the health and safety of the country.9
The international consensus with regard to permanent disposal of
high-level waste and spent fuel is to store the waste in deep geologic
repositories.10 Such repositories house waste deep underground and harness

4 50 U.S.C. § 2586(c)(1) (2013).
STRATEGY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL, supra note 2.

6 Disposal of Commercial Low-Level Radioactive Waste, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST. (Apr.
2012),
http://www.nei.org/Master-Document-Folder/Backgrounders/Fact-Sheets/Disposal-OfCommercial-Low-Level-Radioactive-Waste.
7 BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AMERICA'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF

ENERGY 12 (2012) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY], available at
http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/brc finalreportjan20l2.pdf.
8 Backgrounder on Radioactive Waste, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMMISSION,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/radwaste.html (last updated Feb. 4, 2011).
9 Megan Easley, Standing in Nuclear Waste: Challenging the Disposal of Yucca Mountain,
97 CORNELL L. REv. 659, 665 (2012).
Io STRATEGY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL, supra note 2,
at 7.
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natural rock formations (e.g., salt or granite) to act as radiation barriers."
The United States has one deep geologic repository for low-level
radioactive defense waste, but does not have one for the high-level defense
waste and commercial waste that constitutes the most pressing need for
permanent disposal. 12 Moreover, after the Yucca Mountain project was
terminated in 2010, the United States can no longer say it has even selected
a location for a deep geologic repository.13 High-level defense waste and
commercial waste are currently stored on-site at their respective reactor
locations across the country, with the exception of the Navy's spent fuel,
which is shipped to Idaho Falls, Idaho.14 There are currently sixty-five
nuclear power plants in thirty-one states that store commercial waste,15 but
defense waste is only located in five Department of Energy ("DOE") sites:
Hanford, Washington; Idaho Falls, Idaho; Savannah River, South Carolina;
West Valley, New York; and Fort St. Vrain, Colorado.16 In addition to the
relatively low number of defense waste sites, one site, Hanford, stores
ninety percent of all defense waste.' 7
The Hanford site is a 586 square mile nuclear reservation located in
south-central Washington.' 8 The site is 35 miles north of the Oregon border
and sits along the Columbia River, 215 miles upstream from Portland,
Oregon.' 9 The site was chosen in 1943 for the Manhattan Project, and
produced the plutonium for the bombs detonated over Japan at the end of
World War 11.20 Before ending reactor operations in 1987, Hanford
produced approximately seventy-four tons of plutonium for the U.S.
nuclear weapons arsenal, which was about two-thirds of all U.S.
government plutonium production. 2 1 A former U.S. Secretary of Energy
described Hanford as "the most complex and largest nuclear project in
history." 2 2 By virtue of being the largest nuclear project in history, it is also
the largest nuclear cleanup project in history.
The majority of the approximately 450 billion gallons of waste
produced in Hanford's nearly fifty years of production was released directly
into the ground, or the Columbia River, according to disposal standards in
"REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY, supranote 7, at 29.
12Id. at 95.

1 Yucca Mountain 'Terminated',supra note 2.

14REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY, supranote 7, at 19.
1s Easley, supra note 9, at 662.
16REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY, supranote 7, at 16-17.

17US Should Start Lookingfor Yucca Alternative,supra note 3.
" Hanford Overview and History, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://www.hanford.gov/
page.cfm/HanfordOverviewandHistory (last updated Aug. 26, 2013).
19Noah D. Lichtenstein, The Hanford Waste Site: A Legacy of Risk, Cost, and Inefficiency,
44 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 809, 810 (2004).
20

HanfordOverview and History, supra note 18.
21Lichtenstein, supra note 19.
22
Letterfrom Secretary Steven Chu to Energy DepartmentEmployees, ENERGY.GOV (Feb.
1, 2013,
11:00 AM), http://energy.gov/articles/letter-secretary-steven-chu-energy-departmentemployees-announcing-his-decision-not-serve.
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place at the time.23 This resulted in chemical and radiological contamination
that exceeds current standards; approximately 270 billion gallons of ground
water spread over eighty square miles beneath the site, and millions of tons
of soil along the Columbia River were contaminated.24 Despite its history of
environmental contamination, the future of waste at Hanford is even more
concerning.
A. A Sense of Urgency is Needed
Hanford's most dangerous waste, fifty-six million gallons of mixed
high and low-level radioactive waste, is stored in 177 aging underground
tanks.2 5 Most of these tanks were built during the Cold War in the 1940s
through the 1960s, and have exceeded their designed lifespan of ten to forty
years.26 Moreover, 149 of the tanks were built with a single steel shell, as
opposed to the more secure double shell tanks. 2 7 Over one-third of the tanks
have leaked an estimated one million gallons of radioactive liquid.2 8 While
the DOE considered the tanks stabilized in 2005, the discovery of new leaks
in six tanks in February 2013 and the use of unreliable data analysis by the
DOE in monitoring the tanks, has renewed widespread concern over how
long Hanford's aging temporary storage system can continue in its current
te
29
capacity. Since there is no available technology to plug the existing leaks,
up to 1,000 gallons per year of high-level waste will continue to leak into
the topsoil in the meantime.30
In addition to concern over existing leaks, the crippling of the
Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant in Japan as a result of a devastating
earthquake and tsunami, has raised concern over the potential effect of a
natural disaster striking Hanford.3 ' While Hanford's 177 tanks were built to
protect waste from leaking in the event of an earthquake, and scientists
have historically said a big earthquake in the area is highly unlikely, there
are several reasons why community concerns surrounding Hanford are
23 Lichtenstein,
24

Id. at 812.

supra note 19, at 811-12.

25 About the Project, BECHTEL HANFORD VIT PLANT, http://www.hanfordvitplant.com/
page/theproject/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
26 Lichtenstein, supra note 19, at 812.
27 Craig Welch, 6 Nuclear-Waste Tanks Leaking at Hanford, SEATrLE TIMES (Feb. 22, 2013,
9:22 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2020415477_hanfordleakxml.html.
28 Associated Press, Washington Gov. Inslee Says Hanford Tanks could be Leaking in Range
of 1,000 Gallons Per Year, FoxNEWS.COM (Feb. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Hanford Tanks could be
Leaking], http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/02/27/washington-gov-inslee-says-hanford-tanks-could-beleaking-in-range-1000-gallons/#ixzz2OkYyZi38; About the Project, supra note 25; Welch, supra note
27.
29 Welch, supra note 27.
30
Hanford Tanks could be Leaking, supranote 28.
31 Anna King, Lessons from Japan: Is Hanford Ready to Withstand a Big Earthquake?,
SEATTLE MAG. (Aug. 2011), http://www.seattlemag.com/articlellessons-japan-hanford-ready-withstandbig-earthquake.
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greater than ever.32 First, as mentioned above, the tanks have already
exceeded their intended lifespans and many have leaked even without a
natural disaster. The combination of a moderately large earthquake and
unreliable storage tanks is a dreadful thought to communities in the vicinity
of Hanford, as well as the much larger populations in Washington and
Oregon that rely on the Columbia River for potable water, fisheries, and
recreation. Second, there is very little seismic data from the region around
Hanford from which to base earthquake predictions.33 Brian Sherrod, a U.S.
Geological Survey paleoseismologist, was recently quoted by a Seattle
television station as saying, "I have thought for a long time there is just a
general lack of knowledge about active faults in Central Washington."3 4 In
fact, it took the Fukushima disaster, coupled with new information from a
U.S. Geological Survey that identified previously unknown connections
between the Hanford area's fault lines and those of the Puget Sound region,
for the DOE to approve a new seismic analysis of Hanford. 35 The DOE
expects to complete the study in August 2014.36
In response to the new leaks discovered at Hanford, the DOE
announced on March 6, 2013, that it planned to extract and ship low-level
radioactive waste from Hanford's tanks to WIPP in New Mexico. Having
begun operations in 1999, WIPP is the nation's only permanent geologic
repository; this site also disposes of transuranic ("TRU") defense waste, a
classification of low-level radioactive waste.38 WIPP is legally prohibited
from disposing of high-level waste. Currently, WIPP receives TRU
defense waste that includes a mixture of plutonium contaminated scraps of
machinery and clothing from DOE sites.40 While removing TRU waste
from Hanford would expedite waste removal from undependable tanks, the
DOE has stated that only about three million gallons of Hanford's fifty-six
million gallons of tank waste can likely be categorized as TRU waste. 4 1

id.
33Bill Lascher, PreparingHanfordfor a Major Earthquake, KING5.COM (May 26, 2011,
10:37 AM), http://www.king5.com/news/quake/Part-3-Research-shakes-up-seismic-knowledge-nearNorthwest-nuclear-plant-122070789.html.
32

34 Id.

3s Annette Cary, DOE Plans Seismic Analysis at Hanford, TRI-CITY HERALD (Apr. 17,
2012), http://www.tri-cityherald.com/2012/04/17/1906422/doe-plans-seismic-analysis-at.html.
36 Id.

37DOE Announces Preferencefor Disposal of Hanford Transuranic Tank Waste at WIPP,
ENERGY.GOV (Mar. 6, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://energy.gov/em/articles/doe-announces-preferencedisposal-hanford-transuranic-tank-waste-wipp.
38 Christopher Helman, Nuke Us: The Town That Wants America's Worst Atomic Waste,
FORBES (Jan. 25, 2012, 6:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2012/01/25/nuke-usmeet-the-town-that-wants-americas-worst-nuclear-waste; Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, http://www.wipp.energy.gov (last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
3 Helman, supranote 38.
40 Id
41Waste IsolationPilotPlant, supra note 38.
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The recognized long-term solution to Hanford's aging, leaking
tanks is the nation's most expensive construction project: a $13.4 billion
vitrification plant located at Hanford.42 The vitrification process stabilizes
liquid waste by blending it with glass-forming materials and then allowing
the mixture to solidify in steel canisters.43 The process allows the
radioactivity in the waste to dissipate safely over hundreds of thousands of
years, making the waste environmentally safe for permanent disposal." By
placing the waste in steel canisters, the waste becomes relatively easy to
ship.4 5 With vitrified waste scheduled for production starting in the next
seven years,46 the decision as to where the vitrified waste will be located for
permanent disposal should be taking place now. However, as America's
political saga pertaining to nuclear waste has shown, lasting decisions in
this arena are few and far between.
B. A History of Government Failure
Meaningful congressional action over nuclear issues began with the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ("AEA"), which gave the Atomic Energy
Commission ("AEC") authority to develop military uses of nuclear
energy. 47 The AEA also granted the AEC authority to establish regulations
that are necessary for the protection of public health and property, including
discretion over nuclear waste storage. 4 8 However, the AEA did not provide
specific regulations or directions regarding the long-term management of
the AEC's nuclear waste.49
In 1974, Congress abolished the AEC and delegated its duties to
two new agencies.50 The Energy Research and Development Administration
("ERDA") took over AEC's nuclear weapons program5 ' and Congress gave
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") AEC's regulatory authority
over commercial use of nuclear energy.5 2 Discretion over nuclear waste
storage was left to the respective agencies and no specific plan for the longterm management of nuclear waste was included in the legislation."

42 Welch,
43

supranote 27.
About the Project,supra note 25.

44

Id.

Id
4 Waste Treatment & Immobilization Plant Project, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
http://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/WTP (last updated Feb. 17, 2013).
4 See generally Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954)
(codified at 42 U.S.C § 2121 (2006)).
' 42 U.S.C. §2201 (2006).
49
Id. § 2140(a).
sold. §§ 5814,5841-42.
sI
2 Id. § 5814(d).
Id. § 5841(f).
1 Id. § 5842(3).
45
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In 1977, ERDA merged with several other agencies to become the
DOE. Thus, the DOE obtained control over all defense waste, as well as
the power to create programs and facilities for storage.ss Again, Congress
did not mandate any specific actions be taken for the long-term
56
management of nuclear waste. It was not until the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982 ("NWPA") that Congress passed legislation that included a
plan for permanent disposal of nuclear waste, almost thirty years after
passage of the AEA, and almost forty years after knowledge of the U.S.
nuclear program became ubiquitous. 57
Similar to the recent rise in congressional interest regarding nuclear
waste following the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi disaster, the congressional
action that led to the NWPA was spurred by the 1979 partial core meltdown
at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station in Pennsylvania, which
alerted the entire nation to the dangers of nuclear waste.58 Under the
NWPA, the U.S. government became responsible for permanent disposal of
commercial spent fuel, as well as defense waste.59 The NWPA also
determined that one or more deep geologic repositories was the best longterm strategy for managing the nation's growing stockpiles of commercial
and defense waste.60
An important component of the NWPA relating to defense waste
was its requirement to commingle defense waste with commercial waste
under the repository program unless the president explicitly determined that
a separate repository for defense waste was required.6 1 This decision
resolved four years of vigorous debate over whether defense waste should
be included in the commercial repository program.62 In 1985, the DOE
(acting for the president) evaluated commingling defense waste with
commercial waste and concluded that commingling would save $1.5 billion
compared to having separate repositories.63 Except for this cost difference,
the DOE found no other significant factors distinguishing commingling
from having separate repositories. 64 President Reagan subsequently
54

54Easley, supra note 9, at 664.

ss Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 203(a)(8), 91 Stat. 565
(1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7133(a)(8) (2009)).
5 42 U.S.C. § 7133(a)(8) (2009).
57Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, § Ill, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10131 (2006)).
58Easley, supra note 9, at 666.
" 42 U.S.C. § 10131.
6Id. § 1019I(2)(a).
" Id. § 10107(b)(2).

62BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON AMERICA'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, DISPOSAL SUBCOMMITTEE
REPORT TO THE FULL COMMISSION 16 (2012) [hereinafter DISPOSAL SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT TO THE

FULL COMMISSION],
updated final.pdf.
6
Id at 7.
64

id.

available

at

hup://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/disposal report
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accepted the DOE's conclusion that a defense-only repository was not
required.65
The NWPA also created the Nuclear Waste Fund to finance the one
or more deep geologic repositories that would be constructed.66 The Fund
levied a one-tenth of one cent fee for every kilowatt-hour of electricity
generated on commercial nuclear power reactor owners. In exchange, the
NWPA mandated that the U.S. government take title to commercial nuclear
waste as soon as a repository commenced operation and to dispose of said
waste not later than January 31, 1998.68 To facilitate this goal, the NWPA
also set forth a "schedule for the siting, construction, and operation of
repositories that will provide a reasonable assurance that the public and the
environment will be adequately protected from the hazards posed by highlevel radioactive waste and such spent nuclear fuel as may be disposed of in
a repository." 69 However, it soon became apparent that Congress had
underestimated the politics of selecting a permanent repository and, as a
result, its ambitious schedule was not met.o
After the DOE nominated nine sites for the repository in 1983, it
narrowed the list to three: Hanford; Deaf Smith County, Texas; and Yucca
Mountain, Nevada.71 It was at this point that nuclear waste politics became
extremely contentious, as the congressional delegations from Washington,
Texas, and Nevada became locked in a "Not in My Backyard" struggle to
prevent their state from being selected.72 Congress, frustrated by
lengthening delays and protectionist politics, passed the Nuclear Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1987 (NWPAA), which designated Yucca
Mountain as the sole site under consideration.73 Unfortunately for Nevada,
the decision may have been more political than anything else.74 Narrowing
consideration to Yucca Mountain was not surprising given that Texas and
Washington had Congressional heavyweights on their sides. The Speaker of
the House was a Texas Congressman and the House Minority Leader
represented a district in Washington State.
While the selection of Nevada may have made sense from a
national perspective, Nevada's reaction to the NWPAA - locally known as
65 Memorandum from Ronald Reagan, President of the U.S., to John S. Harrington, Sec'y of
Energy (Apr. 30, 1985) (on file with author).
6 42 U.S.C. § 10222(c)-(d) (2006).
67 Id. § 10222(a)(1)-(2).
61 Id. § 10222(a)(5).
69
Id. § 10131(b)(1).
70 TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40996, THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN LITIGATION:
LIABILITY UNDER THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT (NWPA) OF 1982 1 (2010).
7' Easley, supra note 9, at 668.
72
MARC ALLEN EISNER ET AL., CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY POLICY 261 (1st ed. 2000).
7 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 160(a)(1), 101 Stat.
1330-228 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10172(a) (1987)).
74 EISNER ET AL., supra note 72.
75

id.
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the "Screw Nevada Bill" - was over two decades of resistance. By 1989,
as a result of previous delays caused by politics and impending legal battles
with Nevada, it became apparent that the federal government would not be
able to fulfill its NWPA mandated obligation to dispose of commercial
waste by 1998.n7 Because defense waste was legally tied to commercial
waste per President Reagan's 1985 decision, the permanent disposal of
defense waste would also be delayed. Seventeen years later in 2002,
Congress reiterated its support of Yucca Mountain by officially approving
the location as the repository site. The congressional resolution approving
the selection passed despite strong objections from Nevada.
It was not until June 3, 2008 that the DOE finally filed its 8,600page Yucca Mountain license application with the NRC.80 Under the
NWPA, the NRC was allowed three years to review the license application
and make a final determination to approve or disapprove construction of the
repository.81 In a dramatic turn of events, the DOE filed a motion with the
NRC to withdraw its application with prejudice on March 3, 2010.82 The
DOE's change of heart regarding Yucca Mountain is surprising, especially
after the agency spent twenty years preparing the application and incurred
$12 billion in mining and engineering costs. However, the decision is less
shocking after only a brief examination of the extremely contentious 2008
Democratic Party primary.
Thanks in large part to the influence of the Senate Majority Leader,
Harry Reid (D-Nevada), Nevada was the fourth state to vote in the
Democratic Party primary.84 Locked in a close fight for the highest political
prize in the country, and seeking momentum early in the primary process,
Democratic Party presidential candidates Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton,
and John Edwards all publically opposed Yucca Mountain." Obama
specifically stated that he would "end the notion of Yucca Mountain."86
76 Easley, supra note

9, at 668.
n Id. at 669.
7 Approval of Yucca Mountain Site, Pub. L. No. 107-200, 116 Stat. 735 (2002).
7 US. Senate Approves Yucca Mountain Resolution, INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (July
10, 2002), http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2002/yucca.shtml.
80 DOE's License Application for a High-Level Waste Geologic Repository at Yucca
Mountain, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMMISSION, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/hlw-disposallyucca-licapp.html (last updated Mar. 29, 2012).
8 42 U.S.C. § 10134(d) (2006).
82 U.S. Department of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository)
71 N.R.C. 609 (2010) (order
denying DOE withdrawal motion).
83Helman, supra note 38.
8 Stacy Willis, Making Nevada's Caucus Count, LAS VEGAS SUN (Dec. 26, 2007),
http://content.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1698286,00.html; Primary Season Election Results,
N.Y. TIMES, http://politics.nytimes.com/election-guide/2008/results/votes/index.html (last visited Oct.
26, 2013).
85 Shailagh Murray & Chris Cillizza, The Sunday Fix: Democratic Clout Brings Early
Caucus to Nevada, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2007, at A2.
86Editorial, Where Does It All Go?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008, at A26.
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While Clinton got the best of Obama in the Nevada Caucus, 8 7 when Obama
became president, he wasted no time in making good on his campaign
promise when he assumed office. He appointed a former aide to Senator
Reid as the chairman of the NRC, and appointed a Secretary of Energy
89
who was "unenthusiastic" about Yucca Mountain. In essence, the DOE's
2010 motion to withdraw the license application was the culmination of
Nevada's resistance to Yucca Mountain, as well as its growth in political
might. While litigation is pending regarding whether the DOE had authority
to withdraw its application under the NWPA, as a practical matter, the idea
of Yucca Mountain as a permanent repository is dead in the water.90
Meanwhile, the nation is left wondering whether the federal government
will ever deliver on its promise to take responsibility for the back-end of the
nuclear fuel cycle.
III. THE CURRENT "PLAN"
Congress' decision to force a repository on one state proved to be a
complete failure, ending with the Obama Administration withdrawing the
license application for Yucca Mountain in 2010.9' It was fitting that what
started with political maneuvering to select Yucca Mountain ended with
political maneuvering to kill it. As a result, site selection for a repository
was back at square one.
Having brushed aside twenty years of planning for Yucca
Mountain, the Administration needed to provide a new path to deal with
nuclear waste. However, instead of pushing an alternate location to Yucca
Mountain that surely would have cost precious political capital, the
Administration took the path of least resistance and formed a commission
to study the matter and make recommendations.9 2
President Obama established the Blue Ribbon Commission on
America's Nuclear Future ("BRC") one month before the DOE filed the
93
motion to withdraw its license application for Yucca Mountain.93 Two years
later, on January 26, 2012, the BRC submitted its final report. 9 4 Co-chaired
by former Congressman Lee Hamilton and Former National Security
87 Primary Season Election

Results, supranote 84.

88 Mary Manning, Obama Names Ex-Reid Aide to Lead Nuclear Commission, LAS VEGAS

SUN (May 13, 2009, 1:56 PM), http:// www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/may/13/former-reid-aidelikely-lead-nuclear-commission/.
89Where Does It All Go?, supranote 86.
9 Rob Pavey, NRC's Pending Lawsuits Involve Aiken County, Vogtle, THE AUGUSTA
CHRON. (Feb. 19, 2013, 9:14 AM), http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/govemment/2013-02-19/nrcspending-lawsuits-involve-aiken-county-vogtle.
91 Id.
92 REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY, supra note 7, at iii.

93Id.
94id.
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Adviser Brent Scowcroft,95 the BRC's 158-page report made eight
recommendations toward a new strategy for nuclear waste disposal in the
United States, at the cost of two more years of inaction regarding nuclear
waste disposal.
Given the reasons for the Yucca Mountain plan collapsing, it was
not surprising that the most important recommendation from the BRC was a
"consent-based" repository selection process.97 Citing the Yucca Mountain
experience, the BRC stated that "[e]xperience in the United States and in
other nations suggests that any attempt to force a top-down, federally
mandated solution over the objections of a state or community - far from
being more efficient - will take longer, cost more, and have lower odds of
ultimate success." 98 Other key recommendations focused on the need for
swift action by Congress and the executive branch.99 The BRC
recommended prompt efforts to develop one or more deep geologic
repositories, to develop one or more consolidated interim storage facilities,
and to prepare for the eventual large-scale transport of nuclear waste to the
new sites.100
While the BRC report thoroughly outlined the issue of nuclear
waste and offered sensible recommendations, there was a surprising lack of
controversial findings or recommendations in what is an incredibly
controversial subject. The BRC refused to weigh-in on the contentious
reasons for why the Obama Administration terminated Yucca Mountain
(per former Energy Secretary Chu's instructions that it was time to "turn the
page" on that project).10 ' Moreover, while the BRC did propose a new
process to select a new permanent repository, it did not consider or propose
alternative repository locations to Yucca Mountain.10 2
By refusing to weigh-in on controversial issues, the BRC missed a
unique opportunity to give Congress and the executive branch political
cover in making substantial progress toward a long-term repository. It is
especially surprising that the BRC did not take such an opportunity because
the report itself repeatedly outlined the need for prompt action. As a result,
Congress and the executive branch were only provided with an
uncontentious shell of a plan instead of a true roadmap.
One year after the BRC report's release, the Obama Administration
responded to the report's recommendations in the form of the DOE's
Id. at iv.
Id. at iii.
9
Id. at vii.
9 Id. at ix.
9 Id at xv.
9

96

'"0 Id. at vi i.
10 Letter from Steven Chu, Sec'y of Energy, to Lee Hamilton & Brent Scowcroft, Co-Chairs,

Blue Ribbon Comm'n on America's Nuclear Future (Feb. 11, 2011), available at
http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/correspondence/brc_1etterfrom secretary chu_2-11-2011 .pdf.
102REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY, supra note 7,
at viii.
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Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and HighLevel Radioactive Waste ("Administration's Strategy").103 The fourteenpage document laid out the Administration's policy on the issue of nuclear
waste, and outlined a framework for how to move forward on developing a
system to manage commercial and defense waste. The framework in the
report was essentially a filtered version of the BRC's recommendations. It
highlighted the need for two interim storage facilities in addition to a deep
geologic repository, and called for a consent-based approach to selecting
each location."1" One of the interim storage facilities, a "Pilot Interim
Storage Facility," would focus on receiving waste from shut-down
commercial reactors.'0o The other, a larger, "Consolidated Interim Storage
Facility," would focus on satisfying the federal government's obligation to
take title to commercial waste. 06
The Administration's Strategy called for the pilot facility to begin
operations by 2021, the consolidated facility to be completed by 2025, and
for a repository to be available by 2048.107 While the Strategy prioritized
the transportation of commercial waste over defense waste to the two
interim storage facilities, the strategy left open the possibility of defense
waste going to the interim sites, stating that government owned waste will
be "considered" for transportation to the interim sites. 08 For the permanent
repository, the strategy endorsed the 1985 Reagan decision to commingle
commercial and defense waste.109
Despite the Administration's Strategy adding some specificity to
the BRC's recommendations, it sidestepped providing details on perhaps
the most important and controversial issue pertaining to both commercial
and defense waste: a roadmap for selecting one or more permanent
repositories. Moving to a consent-based selection process is certainly a
positive first step, but it is an obvious one after the failure of Yucca
Mountain. If the Administration truly wanted to quickly move forward on
the issue of finding a repository, it would have provided a detailed plan for
selection that included a methodology for avoiding the profound negative
reaction from potential host states that doomed Yucca Mountain. Instead,
the Administration's Strategy essentially relies on positive thinking, taking
the position that a community, along with that community's state, will
make life easy for everyone and simply volunteer to host a repository.
While that scenario may in fact be what occurs, the painful experience with
" STRATEGY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL, supra note

2.
' Id. at 4.
10Id
07Id. at 2.
'"Id.at 5.
'O'Id at 8.
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Nevada proved that it is far from a certainty. The former chief of U.S.
Geological Studies at Yucca Mountain, William Alley, noted that, given the
power of individual states to kill any repository, even if the local
community wants it, "[s]tates need a strong role in the decision-making
process" of any plan."o However, according to Alley, the Administration's
"new consent-based plan barely mentions the role of states.""' In essence,
the Administration's Strategy assumes the task of finding a consenting state
is inevitable instead of what it really is: an unknown.
Despite the lack of a detailed plan for finding a volunteer
community for a permanent repository, the Administration's Strategy calls
on Congress to amend the NWPA to allow interim storage facilities to be
built before the NRC has issued a license for constructing a permanent
repository.11 2 Such a change would be met with enthusiasm from
communities that currently store commercial waste and, depending on
whether defense waste was also authorized to be stored in interim facilities,
communities that currently store defense waste. However, a repository plan
that is not detailed, and is instead based on the wishful thinking that a
volunteer community will step forward with the consent of its state, will
make it difficult to find communities to volunteer for the interim facilities.
Any community that desires the jobs and resources resulting from an
interim facility would be extremely concerned that, should a volunteer for a
permanent repository not emerge, any "interim" facility would become an
"indefinite" facility. Such communities would only need to look at the
example of Hanford, which is still storing nuclear waste in aging and
leaking tanks long after the tanks' expected lifespan.
In essence, after shutting down the Yucca Mountain project, the
exigency of the situation pertaining to nuclear waste in America demanded
more from the Obama Administration than the establishment of the BRC
and a fourteen-page strategy that only provided scant details on the
inevitable consent-based approach to repository selection. By choosing to
spend its political capital elsewhere, and effectively punting the issue to
Congress, the Obama Administration has added more uncertainty to the
issue of nuclear waste disposal than was present when it came into office.
Because the Administration's Strategy does not specify whether
defense waste would be stored in the proposed interim facilities, sites that
currently store defense waste, such as Hanford, cannot plan appropriately.
If defense waste is actually stored in the interim facilities, then Hanford
would only need short-term storage facilities for the vitrified glass canisters
"0 William Alley & Rosemary Alley, Op-Ed: States Must be Involved in Finding a
Repository for Hanford's Nuclear Waste, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013, 4:01 PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2020518289_williamrosemariealleyopedxml.html?syndication-rss.
11 Id.
112 Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level
Radioactive Waste, supra note 2, at 5-6.
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which are expected to begin production in 2019.113 However, if defense
waste is not stored in the interim facilities, Hanford would need storage
facilities capable of housing the canisters until at least 2048.114 Moreover,
based on the experience with Yucca Mountain, and the possibility that a
repository host volunteer may not readily emerge, Hanford may need to
store its waste long after 2048.
IV. THE CONSENT-BASED APPROACH AND ITS DISCONTENTS: WHY STATES
PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN SITE SELECTION

States react negatively to the idea of having high-level radioactive
waste kept within their borders." 5 The aforementioned protectionist battle
between Nevada, Texas, and Washington state during the 1980s, and the
consistent resistance by Nevada thereafter, is evidence enough.' 16 However,
experience has also shown that local communities often do not agree with
the decisions their states make. For example, Nye County, Nevada, home of
Yucca Mountain, expressed its consent to be host to a permanent repository
after the BRC released its report.'
However, Nevada's governor
immediately told the DOE that Nye County did not speak for Nevada, and
that Nevada would never consent to the Yucca Mountain repository."' A
second example involves WIPP, a rare success story in the area of nuclear
waste.
Located on the remote edge of the Chihuahuan Desert near
Carlsbad, New Mexico, the $6 billion WIPP has brought prosperity to an
otherwise unremarkable rural town of 25,000 people.11 9 Carlsbad's
unemployment rate is 3.8 percent, compared to 6.5 percent statewide, and
the town has 1,300 more jobs as a result of WIPP.120 Moreover, many of
those new jobs are high-paying engineering positions.121
After the federal government started exploratory work in the 1970s
due to the area's thick salt deposits, and after Congress authorized WIPP in
1979, the people of Carlsbad expressed their desire to host WIPP.122
Joanne Berry et al., The Hanford Waste Feed Delivery Operations Research Model,
ENERGYSOLUTIONS (2011), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?amumber-06147927.
114 Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used
Nuclear Fuel and High-Level
Radioactive Waste, supra note 2, at 2.
113

115States' Last-Ditch Attempts to Keep Out Nuclear Waste, THE CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR,

http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/071 1/pO2sOl-usju.html/%28page%29/2 (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
"6 EISNER ET AL., supra note 72; Cy Ryan, Gov. Sandoval: Nye County May Want a Nuke
Dump but it Doesn't Speak for Nevada, LAS VEGAS SUN (Mar. 12, 2012, 6:20 PM),
http://www.iasvegassun.com/news/2012/mar/12/sandoval-nye-county-may-want-nuke-dump-it-doesnts/#ixzz2OkoN8qhg.
7
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Ryan, supra note 116.
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However, New Mexico was not convinced, and it was not until 1999 that
WIPP became operational under the condition that it would not receive
high-level waste.123 Since then, infrastructure improvements, such as roads
and investments in nearby towns, have benefited the state, not just
Carlsbad, and the project won support from political leaders. 124 To date,
WIPP has received 200,000 tons of waste-filled containers. 12 5 More
importantly, the facility has never had a leak. 126
The WIPP experience demonstrates that local communities may be
willing to host nuclear waste facilities, and that they may sometimes win
over pessimistic home states. It took twenty years for Congress to authorize
WIPP and for the facility to begin operations, which shows that state
resistance is a challenge that must be understood and managed from the
beginning of the selection process. WIPP was only accepted by New
Mexico after high-level waste was strictly forbidden from the site. For the
proposed interim sites and permanent repository, the DOE and Congress
will not have the luxury of bargaining away high-level waste in exchange
for state consent.
V. OPTIONS FOR DEFENSE WASTE AND HANFORD'S IMPACT

The current uncertainty over nuclear waste, and defense waste in
particular, has left Congress with a number of options on how to proceed.
This section discusses those options and the impact Hanford would have on
the viability of each option.
A. Option One: Include Defense Waste in Plansfor One of the
Administration'sProposedInterim Sites
The first option Congress may consider is to transfer defense waste
from current DOE sites to one or more of the interim facilities proposed by
the Administration's Strategy, and then to a permanent repository. As
previously mentioned, the Administration's Strategy proposes two interim
storage facilities. The first, a Pilot Interim Storage Facility that would be
operational by 2021, would focus on taking "stranded" waste from shutdown commercial power plants. The rationale for prioritizing this waste is
to allow for the land and resources of old nuclear power plants to be put to
better use than simply storing spent fuel, including the manpower and cost
of guarding the spent fuel. In addition, according to the Administration's
Strategy, prioritizing the spent fuel located at these nine power plants would

13id.

124

id

125id
126id
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allow the federal government to build and demonstrate a system for
transporting and storing spent fuel.127 The Administration's Strategy also
states that successful execution of a transportation and storage system
would demonstrate the government's commitment to its obligation to take
title to commercial waste. 12 8 Essentially, it is a "crawl, walk, run" approach
where the goal of the pilot facility would seemingly be to develop a
successful system on a small scale that could later be expanded to fulfill the
needs of the larger consolidated facility, and eventually, the permanent
repository.
The second proposed interim facility, the Interim Consolidated
Storage Facility, would be scheduled for completion by 2025. It would have
a larger capacity than the pilot facility, and would concentrate on meeting
the federal government's obligation to take title to commercial spent fuel.
Thus, the rationale for the consolidated facility is to avoid long-term
financial liabilities (i.e. lawsuits from commercial power plants) stemming
from the government's failure to meet its obligation.
The Administration's Strategy states that defense waste will be
"considered" for storage at the interim facilities. 129 That approach is in
contrast to the BRC's recommendation to leave defense waste where it is
currently located until a permanent repository is built.i30 The BRC found
that "there appear to be no technical or safety-related reasons to move
defense high-level waste and spent fuel from temporary storage at the DOE
sites where these materials are now located, before final disposal capacity
becomes available."l 31 While technical and safety reasons may not be a
factor for moving defense waste to an interim facility, money and politics
surely will.
The BRC cites cost reduction as a key reason for its
recommendation to prioritize moving commercial waste from shut down
reactors to interim facilities.13 2 The Administration's Strategy also uses this
reasoning in its plan to prioritize commercial spent fuel at the proposed
pilot facility. However, the same rationale for prioritizing commercial spent
fuel can be used to prioritize moving defense waste to interim facilities. The
BRC states that spent fuel stored at shut-down reactors cost between $4.5
and $8 million per year to operate and maintain.133 Because there are nine
shut-down reactors with stranded nuclear fuel, this means that the total cost
savings per year would be between $40.5 million and $72 million. These
127REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY, supra note 7, at 35.

128STRATEGY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL,
supra note

2, at 6.

129Id. at 5.
130
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131Id
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savings pale in comparison to the $1.3 billion that is spent on operations
and maintenance at Hanford alone.134 In addition, shut-down commercial
power plants, and the locations such as Hanford that store defense waste,
are inoperable, meaning that the term "stranded" waste applies as much to
defense waste as it does to spent fuel at shut-down power plants. It also
means that both categories of sites would benefit from being able to use
waste storage space for other purposes.
The arguments for and against including defense waste in an
interim storage facility may ultimately be less important than politics,
which is the factor that influences nuclear waste issues the most. Currently,
the NWPA does not allow an interim facility to be built before construction
of a permanent repository is licensed.' 35 Therefore, assuming a repository
site is not licensed soon, which is a safe bet, Congress will need to pass
legislation amending the NWPA to authorize one or more of the
Administration's proposed interim facilities. Such legislation is sure to
receive vigorous debate relating to whether defense waste would be
included in such facilities. As the experience in narrowing repository
candidates to Yucca Mountain demonstrated in 1987, political power may
decide the outcome. Due to the committee positioning of senators from
Washington and Oregon - two states whose congressional delegations have
vehemently attempted to speed up removal of nuclear waste from Hanford
- any legislation regarding an interim facility that does not allow
acceptance of defense waste will face powerful opposition.
Legislation for an amendment to the NWPA would need to be
passed through the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
whose chairman is Senator Ron Wyden (D-Oregon).13 6 Concerned about
Hanford waste's impact on the Columbia River, which he calls the
"lifeblood" of the region, and that Hanford could become a de facto
repository site if defense waste is included in the same repository process as
commercial waste, Wyden has advocated for prioritizing the disposal of
defense waste.' 37 One of Wyden's first actions as chairman was to tour
Hanford after the leaks in six tanks were discovered in February 2013. A
press release from Wyden's office following the tour stated that, "Hanford
represents an unacceptable threat to the Pacific Northwest and it's time to
134 Shannon Dininny, Hanford Nuclear Waste Tanks Could Explode, Agency Warns,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 2, 2013, 5:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/02/hanfordnuclear-waste-could-explode n 3001134.html.
135REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY, supranote 7, at 41.
136 Jurisdiction, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY
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Oct. 6, 2013).
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move the cleanup of the radioactive waste at the site up on the list of
priorities for the Senate and for the Energy and Natural Resources
Committee. ,,138 As a rsl
result of Wyden's ascendancy to the chairmanship,
and his prioritization of Hanford, an amendment to the NWPA authorizing
interim storage facilities is more likely to include defense waste.
In addition, because of Wyden's leverage as chairman, the DOE is
more likely to recommend the inclusion of defense waste in interim
facilities. An example of Wyden's power may be the DOE's decision to
move Hanford's low-level waste to WIPP following the discovery of the
February 2013 leaks. 139 The DOE's unprecedented decision, coming on the
heels of Wyden's tour of Hanford, seemingly represents a shift within the
DOE to pay more attention to the interests of the Pacific Northwest. Indeed,
WIPP had, until that point, never been authorized to receive tank waste
from Hanford.
The other power player of the Washington and Oregon
Congressional delegations is Senator Patty Murray (D-Washington).14 0
Murray is the Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, a member of the
Senate leadership, and is the second-most senior Democrat on the Energy
and Water Appropriations Subcommittee. 14 1 Every year, the Budget
Committee proposes (and sometimes even passes) an extensive budget that
makes recommendations as to where federal spending should be focused.
While the Senate Appropriations Committee actually allocates funding, the
annual budget sets the tone for fiscal priorities. Murray demonstrated her
power by maintaining Hanford's $2 billion annual allowance in the 2013
budget at a time when sequestration and fiscal restraint caused dramatic
reductions in the budgets of many programs.14 2 In short, Murray has
significant influence to help, harm, or kill any federal program relating to
nuclear waste. If acceptance of defense waste is not included in legislation
to authorize either of the interim facilities, Murray may attempt to cripple
the facilities through lack of funding until defense waste is accepted. In
addition, senators who are impartial to the issue, but who are seeking to
curry favor with the Chairman of the Budget Committee, may get behind
Murray in exchange for having their priorities funded in the annual budget.

138 Wyden Tours Hanford, Holds Town Halls, RON WYDEN SENATOR
FOR OR. (Feb. 27,
2013), http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/blog/post/wyden-tours-hanford-holds-town-halls.
13 DOE Announces Preferencefor Disposal of Hanford Transuranic Tank
Waste at WIPP,
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B. Option Two: Build a Repository Solely for Defense Waste
The second option that Congress may consider pertaining to the
future of defense waste is to split the repository program into two tracks:
one track for commercial waste and a separate track for defense waste.
Congressional delegations from Washington and Oregon have already
proposed such a plan in an effort to keep Hanford's waste from becoming
tangled up in another repository process like the Yucca Mountain failure.' 4 3
There are generally three main arguments for a separate, defense-only
repository.
First, defense waste, and the reason it exists, is much different from
commercial waste. Defense waste was produced to create nuclear weapons
that, arguably, benefited the entire nation. This is in contrast to the spent
nuclear fuel from power plants that was produced to benefit only localized
regions of the country. Therefore, communities that supported nuclear
weapons production deserve to be seen as having performed an important
service for the nation as a whole, in contrast to communities surrounding
nuclear power plants that performed a more localized job for the profit of
corporate power plants.
Second, the vast majority of high-level defense waste cannot be
used for reprocessing, meaning there is no need for a capability to retrieve it
from permanent disposal. 144 On the other hand, spent fuel can be
reprocessed, meaning it is a potentially valuable resource.145 Therefore,
there is a possibility of cost savings from separating the permanent disposal
of defense waste from commercial waste. The United States currently does
not reprocess, but the George W. Bush Administration pursued
reprocessing, albeit with heavy resistance from Congress. 14 6
The DOE's 1985 study regarding whether to commingle defense
waste found that savings would come from disposing of defense waste and
commercial waste in the same repository.14 7 As a result, current law
mandates commingling in a permanent repository.14 8 However, in its 2011
report, the BRC hinted that the Administration should perform another
evaluation of the issue, as there have been significant changes since

143Hearing,supra note 137, at 96-97.
'" STRATEGY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL, supra note

2, at 7.
14 Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel, WORLD NUCLEAR Ass'N, http://www.world(last updated
nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Fuel-Recycling/Processing-of-Used-Nuclear-Fuel/
Sept. 2013).
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1985.149 Key changes noted by the BRC include the DOE's shift from Cold
War nuclear weapons production to cleanup and disposal, the success of
WIPP, and current lack of statutory authority to develop a repository
anywhere except Yucca Mountain." 0
Third, defense waste will be in shippable form in the near future,
allowing the federal government to develop experience while operating a
defense-only repository, then harnessing that expertise when building and
operating a larger commercial repository. With the vitrification plant at
Hanford scheduled to be operational by 2019, and with a vitrification plant
at the Savannah River Site already operational, defense waste will be ready
for shipment to a repository as soon as a repository opens.s15
While it may be sensible in an apolitical environment to construct a
repository solely for defense waste, thereby separating it from the process
of finding a commercial waste repository, the proposal would face stiff
opposition in Congress where senators and representatives are elected at the
state level. In such an "all politics is local" environment, the interests of
constituents and in-state nuclear waste come first. A telling example of this
took place at a hearing of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources
Committee on September 12, 2012, while the Committee was discussing
the future of nuclear waste. Senators Wyden and Maria Cantwell (DWashington) had recently finished expressing interest in putting defense
waste on a different repository track than commercial waste, in part to
protect the Columbia River.15 2 Senator Al Franken (D-Minnesota) was next
to speak. Known for his wit, Franken first agreed that the Columbia River
was an important natural resource, and then politely asked Senators Wyden
and Cantwell if they had ever heard of the Mississippi River.'5 3 Franken's
question was sarcastic and rhetorical, but it had the intended effect: to
express Franken's disagreement that Hanford's waste should be prioritized
ahead of Minnesota's commercial waste, specifically the spent fuel being
stored at the Prairie Island Power Plant near the Mississippi River.154
C. Option Three: Continue to Store Defense Waste at CurrentLocations
andExpand WIPP
If Congress does not authorize defense waste for inclusion in
legislation for either of the Administration's proposed interim facilities, and
1' REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY, supranote 7, at 64.
150Id
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a repository solely for defense waste is not built, the current status quo will
persist. That is, defense waste will continue to be stored at current locations
until a permanent repository is constructed for commingled defense and
commercial waste. As the experience with Yucca Mountain has shown, this
can be a long and arduous process ending in failure. In addition,
congressional delegations from Washington and Oregon have opposed the
idea because they believe waiting for a commingled repository means
Hanford will become a de facto repository. 1s However, there is one
potential path to a repository that may take relatively less time to get
licensed and has a realistic chance of avoiding the fate of Yucca Mountain.
That path involves expanding WIPP. Instead of only allowing TRU
waste, this approach would allow WIPP to dispose of high level waste and
spent fuel. The reason WIPP may have the best chance of being a
permanent repository is political in nature: New Mexico has already
benefited from WIPP in the form of federally funded roads, over $3 billion
in economic investment into the state, and most importantly, jobs. 15 6 Those
benefits have all come without any leaks or spills, proving to New Mexico
that WIPP can dispose of nuclear waste in a safe and reliable way.'5 7
Therefore, New Mexico, having enjoyed the benefits of radioactive waste
disposal, may want to seek additional federal investment. The town of
Carlsbad, which has benefitted the most from WIPP, has already begun
marketing itself as the best location for a permanent repository.15 8
In addition to WIPP's success, the site's thick salt formations may
give it advantages over other potential repository locations. Stretching from
New Mexico to Kansas, the salt deposit surrounding WIPP is the largest in
America, meaning the capacity of the site may be enormous.15 9 Also, salt is
seen by many as the most attractive option for nuclear waste disposal
because it quickly heals cracks from seismic activity and would reduce
environmental damage from leaks.160 In contrast, the volcanic tuff that
Yucca Mountain is made of does not heal as well and may let water seep in
and radiation escape over thousands of years.16 ' The DOE has already
begun studying the salt formations around WIPP for the potential purpose
of expanding the types of waste WIPP can dispose of.162 These studies, the
experience of operating WIPP, and a relatively educated New Mexico
public on the issue of nuclear waste will save time in getting a repository
application approved by the NRC should WIPP be selected.
.. Id. at 13, 19 (statements of Sen. Ron Wyden, Chairman, and Sen. Maria Cantwell,
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Even with WIPP's success, the seemingly ideal location for large
amounts of nuclear waste, and the consent of the local community, New
Mexico's political leaders will ultimately make the final decision on
expanding WIPP. New Mexico Governor, Susana Martinez, tentatively
supports the idea, but needs scientific confirmation that it would be safe.163
Senator Tom Udall (D-New Mexico) appears less enthusiastic about the
idea. Senator Udall spoke out immediately following the DOE's decision to
move low-level waste from Hanford's tanks to WIPP following the
February 2013 discovery of leaks at Hanford, saying that any proposal to
modify the type of waste accepted at WIPP would need "strong justification
and public input."'6 Whether it is Governor Martinez's tentative support,
or Senator Udall's coolness, that would ultimately prevail in New Mexico
remains to be seen, but the one thing that can be counted on is a hardfought, internal debate over the matter.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE OPTION THAT CONGRESS SHOULD PURSUE
All things considered, a combination of option one and option three
has the best chance of success: sending defense waste to one of the
proposed interim facilities and expanding WIPP. Sending defense waste to
one of the two interim facilities would be in line with the Administration's
Strategy because the Strategy says defense waste will be "considered" for
storage at one of the facilities. In addition, sending defense wasted to an
interim facility but later permanently disposing of it at a repository along
with commercial waste would be in line with the 1985 Reagan decision to
commingle defense and commercial waste in a repository.
This combination of options would also appease the Washington
and Oregon delegations who are concerned that Hanford would become a
de facto repository if Congress continued to delay in selecting a repository
location. This would also clear the way for Congressional legislation
amending the NWPA to authorize the interim facilities. Further, assuming
studies confirm WIPP's salt deposits are satisfactory for disposing of highlevel waste and spent fuel, it has the best chance of passing through the
state and federal political gauntlets. Moreover, if its seemingly large
capacity is confirmed, it may be the only repository America needs,
requiring the difficult process of selecting a repository to be done only
once. Given the history of nuclear waste politics in America, this would be
an achievement sure to pay dividends long into the future.
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